Firms raise a significant amount of funds and gain competitive advantage over their rivals through equity financing, namely through initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings. The authors find that both initial public offering firms and seasoned equity offering firms adopt a more aggressive marketing strategy during the two years following their offering. However, not all equity issuers benefit equally from increased marketing spending, which can help signal companies' growth prospects to investors. A key moderator of the link between marketing investment and firm value is the strategic flexibility of rivals with respect to issuers. In particular, the stock market reacts favorably to an aggressive marketing strategy initiated by issuers competing against rivals with relatively less flexibility, whereas increased marketing expenditures do not translate into higher firm value when rivals have greater flexibility. Furthermore, the authors show that marketing expenditures create value within context: the role of marketing in enhancing shareholder value and the moderating effect of rivals' strategic flexibility are more pronounced in the two-year window immediately following an equity offering than at any other time. The authors conclude with a discussion of implications for theory and practice.
A lthough the extant literature on the marketing-finance interface links investments in marketing to subsequent financial outcomes (for a review, see Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009) , researchers have paid surprisingly little attention to the effect of corporate financial policy on marketing strategy and subsequent firm value. As Garmaise (2009, p. 325) notes, "Marketing assets are typically financed with equity." Thus, a better understanding of the connection between marketing strategy and firms' acquisition of equity capital through initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is critical to longer-term success; yet very little is known about how strategic marketing investments are related to these financing decisions. Such an understanding is needed to help marketers achieve a more equal footing with other members in the boardroom (Nath and Mahajan 2008; Verhoef and Leeflang 2009) .
Initial public offerings take place when firms seek equity investment from the public for the first time. In contrast, SEOs involve the issuance of additional equity by public companies to raise capital. Both IPOs and SEOs play a critical role in enhancing firms' competitive positions in product markets because issuers can raise significant amounts of cash to finance new projects (Akhigbe, Borde, and White 2003; Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl 2010) . However, the following key questions of interest for marketers have not been addressed to date: (1) To what extent do firms change their marketing efforts as a result of raising significant amounts of capital through the issue of equity? (2) How does this change in marketing investment affect subsequent firm value? and (3) Are returns to firms' marketing efforts during the immediate postoffering period different than during other time periods? The current study addresses all three questions.
Researchers have begun to examine how changes in the marketing strategies of equity-issuing firms made before the equity offering affect financial outcomes. For example, Luo (2008) investigates how IPO firms can use marketing investments to achieve a higher level of raised capital by increasing demand for their stocks. Mizik and Jacobson (2007) examine firms' marketing expenditures before SEO issuance and find that the long-term stock performance of firms that decrease their marketing spending in the preoffering period is inferior to that of other issuing firms that do not reduce their pre-SEO spending. However, these studies focus exclusively on the preoffering marketing strategies of issuing firms and do not examine how issuing firms' marketing efforts change in the postoffering period or how investors respond to these changes.
Using data sets of IPOs and SEOs issued in the United States between 1970 and 2004, we find that both IPO and SEO firms adopt a more aggressive marketing strategy during the two-year period following their offering. 1 We argue that increased marketing expenditures enable issuers to signal their growth prospects to the stock market and communicate a willingness to make major investments in marketbased assets. In that sense, these postoffering marketing investments can help managers mitigate investor concerns that the equity issuance is nothing more than an attempt to "cash in" on market overvaluation (Myers and Majluf 1984) but instead a legitimate initiative to take advantage of growth opportunities. However, we then contend that not all firms benefit equally from an increase in postoffering marketing spending and identify a boundary condition for the link between marketing expenditures and firm value: strategic flexibility of rivals with respect to issuers.
Drawing on previous research (e.g., Aaker and Mascarenhas 1984; Ansoff 1965), we use financial leverage (i.e., debt-to-asset ratio) as a proxy for strategic flexibility. This measure fits well with the context of our study and is rooted in both theoretical and empirical literature examining the link between firms' financial strength and product market behavior (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein 1990; Chevalier 1995; Gielens et al. 2008; Telser 1966) . The main finding emerging from this stream of literature is that firms with low financial leverage (i.e., higher strategic flexibility) are better able to respond to an aggressive product market strategy initiated by a competitor, whereas highly leveraged firms often lack the resources needed to counteract an aggressive strategy. Moreover, highly leveraged firms, which have a higher probability of experiencing financial distress and bankruptcy, may be reluctant to invest in marketing resources due to their intangible and nontransferable nature (Grullon, Kanastas, and Kumar 2006; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998) .
Our results suggest that the stock market reacts favorably to an aggressive marketing strategy initiated by equity issuers competing against rivals with relatively less strategic flexibility, whereas increased marketing expenditures do not translate into higher firm value when the rivals have more strategic flexibility than the issuers (i.e., they have a lower percentage of debt vs. equity financing in their capital structures). Furthermore, we address whether the significant interactive effect of marketing resources and relative strate-
/ Journal of Marketing, September 2013
gic flexibility on firm value is only observed in the periods immediately following equity issuance or whether this effect also manifests itself during other periods. The postoffering period is unique for several reasons, making it a worthwhile period in which to examine the marketing-finance interface.
First, equity offerings may convey the unfavorable message that the firm's shares are overvalued (Myers and Majluf 1984) . In addition, equity issuance (especially IPOs) can signal a change in the outlook of an industry as a whole, leading to increased investor attention not only for issuers but also for their rivals (Akhigbe, Borde, and White 2003) . Therefore, during the postoffering period, there is greater need for marketing spending, which can help firms communicate their growth prospects to investors. Second, an equity offering recapitalizes the firm in a way that significantly decreases its debt-to-equity ratio, leading to a major and rapid shift in its strategic flexibility against rivals. Third, because equity-issuing firms raise significant amounts of cash that can be used to finance new projects, these firms gain a temporary competitive advantage over rivals (Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl 2010) . Thus, we contend that marketing investments in this postoffering period can have a particularly profound impact on shareholder wealth. Consistent with our prediction, we find that although strategic flexibility of rivals moderates the relationship between marketing expenditures and firm value in all periods, this effect is more significant in the years immediately following equity issuance than in other periods.
Our research makes at least two important contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to introduce, operationalize, and empirically test the concept of strategic flexibility in the marketingfinance literature. Johnson et al. (2010, p. 85 ) point out that "[strategic flexibility] has not been considered from strategically crucial marketing perspectives." Specifically, we examine how enhanced flexibility is associated with aggressive marketing strategy and in turn how stock return performance reflects this relationship. It is important to study strategic flexibility because it is a key factor determining firms' willingness and ability to adapt to changing competitive environments. Theories of market-based assets (Srivastava et al. 1998 ) and customer equity (Rust et al. 2004) suggest that increased marketing efforts can help firms enhance their market values. Our study demonstrates that this impact is likely to be heterogeneous not only across firms but also across market situations. In particular, investors' assessments of the strategic flexibility of industry rivals moderate how they respond to changes in firms' marketing investments (shown as a moderating effect in Figure 1 ), and this effect is more salient during the postoffering period.
Second, we contribute to the nascent literature on the marketing-finance interface around equity offerings. Whereas Luo (2008) and Mizik and Jacobson (2007) show that issuing firms either use or sacrifice preoffering marketing resources to raise more capital, we examine whether issuers use raised funds to finance further marketing investments and how investors react to changes in their marketing spending. Our contribution beyond these studies is critical because managers, who command significantly greater resources during the postoffering versus preoffering period, need to better understand the impact of postoffering investments in marketing on firm value to make appropriate and timely spending decisions. Moreover, our study is fundamentally different from Luo's (2008) and Mizik and Jacobson's (2007) in that we examine the impact of corporate financial policy on marketing spending (which in turn affects shareholder wealth), whereas they focus solely on the effect of marketing spending on financial metrics. We illustrate this distinction in Figure 1 as Path A versus Path B. Relatedly, our study offers practical implications that are relevant for the postoffering period, when firms have greater flexibility to undertake major investments, whereas Luo (2008) and Mizik and Jacobson (2007) offer implications that are applicable in the period leading up to the offering.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we present our conceptual framework and derive testable hypotheses. Next, we describe the marketing and financial data sources we use in our empirical study, explain our methodology, and present our results. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings.
Conceptual Background
Most firms must routinely consider various forms of financing to be able to make appropriate marketing decisions. Although firms' capital structures exhibit considerable cross-sectional variation, many firms find it necessary at
The Role of Relative Strategic Flexibility / 59 some point to access public equity. Through IPOs, private firms raise a significant amount of funds with which to finance new projects. Indeed, IPOs play an important role in the growth of the U.S. economy, representing $285 billion raised through more than 1,000 offerings during the first decade of the twenty-first century. 2 Successful IPOs provide issuing firms with additional benefits, including increased public recognition and heightened financial analyst interest. In addition, IPOs not only satisfy the immediate capital requirements of the firm but also enable firms to make subsequent equity offerings to raise additional capital, typically referred to as SEOs. These offerings are an important source of external funding for public companies in that the number of SEOs issued during the first decade of the twenty-first century is more than double the number of IPOs.
Although equity offerings provide firms with various benefits, they do not guarantee superior subsequent firm performance. Indeed, most extant work shows the opposite. For example, previous research (e.g., Jain and Kini 1994; Loughran and Ritter 1997) has shown that both IPO and SEO firms significantly increase their investment in physical assets such as new machines, equipment, plants, and stores in the postoffering period. However, excessive capital expenditures by issuing firms can result in the deterioration of operational performance. Indeed, although IPO 2 We retrieved these data from Jay Ritter's website (Ritter 2011 •The current study •Mizik and Jacobson (2007) •Luo (2008) •The current study firms often significantly increase their postoffering capital expenditures, their profitability and productivity typically decline substantially (Chemmanur, He, and Nandy 2010) . In parallel, SEO firms have higher ratios of capital expenditure and research and development (R&D) to assets than nonissuers in the years following equity issuance, and yet their operating performance-as measured by operating income relative to sales, profit margin, and return on assets-decreases significantly following the offering (Fu 2010; Loughran and Ritter 1997) . Relatedly, both IPO and SEO firms, on average, experience poor postoffering stock return performance (for a review, see Ritter 2003) . Recent IPOs with disappointing postoffering stock performance, such as Facebook, Groupon, and Zynga, have fueled the long-lasting debate on whether firms sell shares to the public to take advantage of growth opportunities or to convert overvalued equity into cash. In their seminal article, Myers and Majluf (1984) develop an adverse selection model, proposing that managers-who are better informed than investors about the value of the firm's assets in place and growth opportunities-prefer to issue equity when their private valuation is lower than that of investors. Thus, equity offerings may be interpreted as a signal that the issuer's stock is overvalued (Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986) . It is therefore critical for managers of equity-issuing firms to communicate their firms' prospects to investors clearly and take actions highlighting their commitment to undertake profitable investment opportunities. Luo (2008) and Chemmanur and Yan (2009) examine whether issuers change their marketing spending before issuance to reduce information asymmetries and how such spending changes affect investors' reactions to offering announcements. On the one hand, Luo (2008) argues that managers can better convey their firm's intrinsic value and future prospects to potential investors by using productmarket advertising, enabling them to enhance trading volumes, reduce IPO underpricing, and thereby raise more capital. Consistent with this view, Chemmanur and Yan (2009) find that, on average, IPO firms spend more on advertising in the IPO year than the pre-IPO years. On the other hand, Mizik and Jacobson (2007) find that some SEO firms engage in "myopic management," cutting their marketing spending before issuance so they can report higher earnings and sell shares at a higher price. All three studies focus solely on changes in the preoffering marketing expenditures of issuing firms (i.e., Path B in Figure 1 ). However, analysis of postoffering changes in the marketing spending of IPO and SEO firms and the valuation impact of these changes is also needed; this analysis is the focus of our study. In the postoffering period, issuers have more resources and greater flexibility to alter their marketing efforts and better communicate their growth prospects to investors.
We contend that increased marketing efforts during the postoffering period can enable managers to reveal their favorable private information about their firms' future profitability and productivity, helping investors better assess the issuers' growth opportunities as well as the return on their current investments in physical assets. Previous research provides the basis for this argument. Erickson and Jacobson (1992) , for example, conduct one of the earliest studies pointing out 60 / Journal of Marketing, September 2013 the signaling role of marketing spending. They maintain that increased advertising expenditures are associated with greater stock returns because investors interpret them as signals of higher future profitability. Other studies have highlighted that marketing data can help investors form more accurate expectations about the size, timing, and risk of a company's future cash flows (e.g., Joshi and Hanssens 2010; Srivastava et al. 1999 ). This stream of literature proposes that greater investment in marketing resources enhances cash flow, accelerates the receipt of cash flow, and reduces the firm's vulnerability to cash flow variability.
In particular, theories of market-based assets (Srivastava et al. 1998 ) and customer equity (Rust et al. 2004) suggest that increased marketing spending helps firms generate valuable assets such as strong brands and loyal customers, thus creating entry and switching barriers. Consequently, high levels of marketing spending can be an indication of greater future profitability. For example, a firm that builds new facilities and buys new machinery to increase its production capacity can signal a greater return on these investments through higher marketing expenditures, which will help the firm boost its sales and utilize its higher capacity. Indeed, Rao and Bharadwaj (2008) demonstrate that marketing activities boost productivity by reducing a firm's total working capital requirement. In parallel, a company that raises equity can open stores in a new region but will benefit more fully by using some of its capital on higher advertising spending to attract new customers and increase sales to existing customers. Furthermore, McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim (2007) show that more advertising lowers a company's systematic risk (and thus cost of capital) by insulating it from the negative impact of market downturns.
Overall, recent literature has suggested that marketing investments can increase firm value by leading investors to revise their future cash flow expectations upward as well as to discount those cash flows at a lower rate. However, we argue that not all firms can be expected to benefit from pursuing an aggressive marketing strategy following equity issuance. We propose the strategic flexibility of rivals as a significant moderator of how investors respond to firms' increased marketing efforts.
Strategic Flexibility
Strategic flexibility is broadly defined as having the organizational capability and resources that enable a firm to respond quickly and effectively to changing competitive conditions (e.g., Harrigan 1985; Sanchez 1995; Zhou and Wu 2010) . However, as Grewal and Tansuhaj (2001, p. 72) note, "It is best to consider strategic flexibility a polymorphous construct; that is, the exact meaning and conceptualization of strategic flexibility varies from one context to another." For example, Aaker and Mascarenhas (1984) propose that flexibility can be linked to several functional areas such as operations (e.g., maintaining excess capacity), management (e.g., having a decentralized decision-making system), marketing (e.g., participating in multiple product markets), and finance (e.g., having emergency borrowing and stock-issuing power). In our study, we focus on the financial flexibility dimension and discuss how it relates to firms' strategic marketing decisions.
Liquid assets, in addition to providing the capacity to raise additional financial resources when necessary, allow firms to both absorb and react to unfavorable developments in their competitive environments. In particular, maintaining an adequate level of flexibility in other functional areas such as operations and marketing depends critically on whether firms have sufficient financial flexibility. Previous studies (e.g., Aaker and Macarenhas 1984; Ansoff 1965) have suggested that financial leverage (i.e., debt-to-asset ratio) is a critical determinant of flexibility. The key advantage of financial leverage is that it is an objective measure that is publicly available for a large number of firms. In line with previous research, as we discuss in detail subsequently, we maintain that highly leveraged firms have less strategic flexibility and are less likely to respond to the aggressive marketing tactics of their equity-issuing competitors.
Other possible financial measures of strategic flexibility include such variables as cash and current ratio (i.e., current assets divided by current liabilities). We contend that leverage is a more appropriate measure of flexibility in our context for two reasons. First, contrary to popular belief, previous research has indicated that financially constrained (vs. unconstrained) firms tend to hold more cash due to precautionary motives (e.g., Whited and Wu 2006) . Thus, larger cash reserves alone do not necessarily indicate a higher level of strategic flexibility. Second, in contrast to financial leverage, cash and current ratio neither measure the difficulty of obtaining additional capital nor capture the degree of managers' reluctance to make investments in intangible assets. In addition, note that financial leverage is a more forwardlooking measure in that firms using more debt must pay out a larger part of their current and future cash flows as interest payments, reducing their future cash holdings. To shed some light on how financial leverage limits firms' strategic flexibility, we next review the finance literature focusing on the link between leverage and product-market behavior.
Financial Leverage and Flexibility
The finance literature has extensively studied the connection between financial markets and product markets (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein 1990; Campello 2006; Chevalier 1995; Kovenock and Phillips 1997; Phillips 1995 ). Telser's (1966) so-called long-purse theory of predation describes how cash-rich firms drive their financially weak rivals out of the market by adopting aggressive product market strategies that reduce rivals' cash flows. Relatedly, Bolton and Scharstein (1990) argue that financial constraints imposed on rival firms (by their external financiers) encourage deeppocketed firms to engage in predatory behavior and force these financially weak rivals out of business.
Several studies provide empirical support for the longpurse argument. For example, Opler and Titman (1994) find that highly leveraged firms in distressed industries lose market share to their less leveraged rivals. In parallel, Chevalier (1995) documents that highly leveraged supermarkets compete less aggressively and are subject to aggressive competitive behavior (e.g., market expansion) by less leveraged firms. Similarly, European retailers with higher leverage have been shown to experience poorer per-
The Role of Relative Strategic Flexibility / 61
formance than their less leveraged counterparts following Wal-Mart's 1999 entry into the United Kingdom (Gielens et al. 2008 ). Kovenock and Phillips (1997) find that a firm is more likely to close plants and less likely to make major new investments following leveraged recapitalization (i.e., changing capital structure by significantly increasing debt). In a related study, Zingales (1998) finds that highly leveraged trucking firms were less likely to survive following the Carter deregulation because high levels of debt limited carriers' ability to invest and affected the price they could charge during the price wars after the deregulation.
This limited flexibility and weakened competitive response ability of highly leveraged firms is partly because they must use cash generated from operations to service their debt loads. As a result, highly leveraged firms can find themselves in a situation in which they must limit their investment, cut discretionary expenses, and reduce the quality of their products and services. For example, Matsa (2011) finds that high leverage and limited corporate liquidity are associated with more frequent stockouts and lower product quality in the supermarket industry. Even when expenses do not need to be cut, high-leverage firms are often constrained in their ability to raise additional debt capital because they have used most of the credit lines available to them. In addition, their cost of equity is high due to the increased riskiness associated with large debt on their balance sheet. Finally, research has shown highly leveraged firms to be reluctant to make major marketing investments such as advertising due to the intangible and nontransferable nature of marketing assets (Grullon, Kanatas, and Kumar 2006) . That is, because leverage increases the probability of financial distress and because marketing assets cannot be liquidated in the case of financial distress (or bankruptcy), highly leveraged firms tend to limit their marketing expenditures.
In light of the previous discussion, we propose that an IPO or SEO firm competing against rivals with less strategic flexibility is more likely to benefit from increasing its marketing efforts after an equity offering than a firm operating in an industry composed of rivals with relatively higher strategic flexibility. This is because the value of growth opportunities communicated through increased marketing spending depends critically on the extent to which industry rivals would react to take advantage of similar opportunities. Indeed, investors may negatively view an aggressive marketing strategy initiated by an issuer with relatively flexible rivals due to the timely and effective responses that those rivals can make, which results in lower stock returns. Formally:
The relative strategic flexibility of industry rivals with respect to IPO-and SEO-issuing firms moderates the relationship between issuers' postoffering marketing expenditures and firm value. Specifically, increased marketing expenditures are associated with higher firm value for issuers facing rivals with relatively less flexibility but not for issuers facing rivals with relatively more flexibility.
Postoffering Period Versus Nonoffering Period
We further propose that the postoffering period, which we define as the first and second years after the offering year, is different from other periods in that firms facing rivals with less flexibility are more likely to benefit from increased marketing efforts during this period. We build our argument on the basis of two streams of literature: investor reaction around offerings (e.g., Asquith and Mullins 1986; Bayless and Chaplinsky 1996; Masulis and Korwar 1986) and competitive effects of offerings (e.g., Akhigbe, Borde, and White 2003; Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl 2010 ). An extensive stream of literature in finance has emphasized that managers sell their companies' shares to the public to exploit equity mispricing rather than to raise capital for profitable investment opportunities. Although investors are already generally concerned with holding or buying overvalued stocks, these concerns are heightened when companies announce equity offerings. This is because the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that managers prefer to finance investments with debt and retained earnings and will only issue equity when their private valuation of their company's stock is lower than that of the market. An equity issuance therefore may convey the message that the company's stock is overvalued, and issuing firms that fail to communicate their prospects to investors can expect poor stock returns. Accordingly, the role of marketing spending in mitigating investors' concerns that a particular stock is overvalued is expected to be more pronounced during the period that immediately follows an offering as compared with nonoffering periods.
Another important reason the postoffering period is unique is that a firm's equity issuance leads to a change in the industry's competitive environment. Equity-issuing firms raise a significant amount of funds and thus gain a temporary edge over their rivals. Firms can use proceeds from the offering to initiate new competitive tactics, which alter the industry dynamics. Furthermore, equity issuance recapitalizes the issuing firm in a way that results in a significant and immediate decline in its debt-to-capital ratio, enhancing its relative strategic flexibility versus rivals. Such a leverage-decreasing shift in a firm's capital structure, a rapid improvement in flexibility, is unlikely to occur during periods other than those immediately following an equity offering. In addition, equity issuance-particularly an IPO-may signal a change in industry outlook and increase investor attention toward not only issuers but also their rivals. Relatedly, Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010, p. 495) recommend that "firms that compete with IPO candidates need to understand how new issuance affects their competitive environment and how they can strategically respond to it." However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the competitive advantages of issuers, including heightened investor attention, will last forever. As the offering proceeds are used up, marketing strategies are implemented, and growth opportunities become fewer, the temporary relative advantage of issuers will dissipate.
The previous discussion suggests that the role of marketing in enhancing firm value and the moderating role of relative strategic flexibility are expected to be stronger in the immediate postoffering period versus other periods for three main reasons: (1) increased investor attention for both issuers and rivals, (2) a significant shift in the strategic flexibility of issuers relative to their rivals, and (3) intensified competition among industry members. Formally:
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H 2 : The interactive effect of firms' marketing expenditures and their rivals' relative strategic flexibility on firm value is more pronounced in the years immediately following an equity offering (i.e., year +1 and year +2) than in other periods. To ensure that our results are not driven by small firms, we exclude those issuers with total assets less than $10 million at the end of the offering year. This filtration criterion is commonly used in studies that examine capital structure changes and equity issuance (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 2002; Leary and Roberts 2005) . Furthermore, after eliminating offerings with insufficient stock return and accounting/ marketing data to enter into our regression analyses, the final IPO sample represents 1,581 offerings, and the final SEO sample represents 1,729 offerings by 1,200 unique firms. 3 Table 1 summarizes the sample statistics for the final sets of IPO and SEO firms. Panel A reports the distribution of offerings by industry, and Panel B reports the distribution by year. 4 Panels C and D summarize the mean and standard deviation for five characteristics of the IPO and SEO firms as reported in the year of the offering (i.e., year 0): total assets, market value, annual sales growth, marketing intensity (the firm's marketing spending in the issue year scaled by its total assets), and financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets). 3 We cannot directly compare the size of our SEO sample with that reported in Mizik and Jacobson (2007) due to differences in data filtration (e.g., we exclude SEOs issued within two years following the IPO) and sample period between the two studies. However, we obtain a number (i.e., 2,281) close to what they report (i.e., 2,238) if we restrict our sample to the period 1970-2001 and do not exclude SEOs issued within two years following an IPO. 1970  5  5  8  8  1971  17  22  24  32  1972  46  68  23  55  1973  6  74  8  63  1974  0  74  4  67  1975  1  75  18  85  1976  11  86  32  117  1977  6  92  15  132  1978  2  94  31  163  1979  5  99  19  182  1980  19  118  65  247  1981  20  138  50  297  1982  14  152  40  337  1983  102  254  140  477  1984  27  281  23  500  1985  41  322  39  539  1986  69  391  52  591  1987  59  450  43  634  1988  20  470  17  651  1989  28  498  25  676  1990  16  514  23  699  1991  46  560  80  779  1992  81  641  65  844  1993  111  752  69  913  1994  74  826  56  969  1995  105  931 These statistics reveal that IPO firms tend to be smaller than SEO firms, as measured by total assets and market value. Specifically, the average SEO firm is almost eight times larger than the average IPO firm in terms of asset size. In addition, IPO firms experience larger sales growth in the year of the offering and have lower financial leverage and higher marketing intensity than SEO firms. Notably, whereas SEO firms, on average, experience a 41% growth in sales during the offering year, IPO firms report an average sales growth of 111%. Given that the IPO and SEO samples consist of firms with significantly different characteristics, we test our first hypothesis separately for each group. However, we use a combined sample of two groups when testing H 2 because it compares the postoffering and nonoffering periods.
Data and Measures

Measures
Stock returns. We measure changes in firm value using stock returns. Drawing from previous research (e.g., Currim, Lim, and Kim 2012; Srinivasan, Lilien, and Sridhar 2011; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998a, b) , we calculate the annual stock return for a given fiscal year following the offering by compounding the monthly stock returns for 12 months (starting with the first month of the fiscal year following the IPO or SEO year). To control for the size and value risk (Fama and French 1993) , we include lagged market value and book-to-market ratio of issuers in our regression analyses. Mizik and Jacobson (2003, 2008) and Mizik (2010) use a similar approach. 5
Marketing expenditures. Following Mizik and Jacobson (2007) and Luo (2008) , we use selling and general administrative expenditures (SG&A; Compustat item XSGA) minus R&D expenditures (Compustat item XRD) scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat item AT) as a measure of the firm's marketing expenditure intensity (MKT). We do not use advertising expenditure (also available on Compustat) as a measure of marketing intensity for two main reasons. First, under generally accepted accounting principles, companies are not required to disclose their advertising spending in the income statement as a separate line item or in the notes to it, whereas this is not the case for SG&A and R&D. Thus, limiting our analysis to those firms with available advertising data would restrict our sample and potentially introduce selection bias. Second, the advertising expenditure item excludes several major marketing expenditures, such as salaries of the sales and marketing staff, sales commissions, and operating expenses of company-owned stores, which are a significant part of total marketing spending. 6 Because the investors react only to unexpected information (Fama 1970 (Fama , 1991 , explanatory variables should reflect unanticipated changes. We calculate unexpected changes in marketing spending as deviations from industry forecasts using the cross-sectional model as implemented by Roychowdhury (2006) , Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) , and 5 We do not use Fama-French (1993) three-factor or Carhart (1997) four-factor models to calculate stock returns, because we have only 12 observations in each year with which to estimate these models for each firm. As Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) state, 12 observations are too few to reliably estimate regression betas and alpha, with the latter representing the average monthly abnormal stock return for the firm. However, we test the robustness of our results by using the calendar-time portfolio approach with a four-factor model (Carhart 1997) . The results are available upon request. We do not present these results in the article, because the calendar-time portfolio approach is intended to test market mispricing, which is not the goal of the present study. 6 We acknowledge that our proxy for marketing expenditures includes nonmarketing expenses such as administrative personnel salaries. However, we use the unexpected component of the marketing expenditure intensity (rather than its level) in our analysis. Thus, we believe that our measure captures mainly the unexpected increase in marketing spending because an abnormal increase in administrative personnel salaries or other similar items following the offering would not be expected (in particular not after controlling for firm size). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) in the accounting literature. 7 Following this estimation approach, the "normal" level of marketing expenditures can be expressed as a linear function of lagged sales (Compustat item SALE) and an asset-scaled constant (as shown in Equation 1). The intuition behind this approach is that within an industry, greater sales are associated with greater marketing spending. Thus, variation in sales can account for a significant amount of variation in firms' marketing intensity. This is consistent with recent studies that have used the change in a company's sales as the sole factor in predicting the change in its marketing expenditures (e.g., Kim and McAlister 2011). A key advantage of our approach is that it holds economy-and industrywide factors constant by estimating industry-level regressions separately for each year in the sample period. Furthermore, the model includes an asset-scaled constant to avoid a spurious correlation between scaled marketing expenditures and scaled sales due to variation in the scaling variable (i.e., total assets).
For each year, we estimate Equation 1 for every industry, classified according to its two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, by using all the firms (with available data) in that industry. These estimations generate industry-specific betas that vary across time. We require at least ten observations for each industry-year grouping to obtain reliable estimates of the coefficients. Table 2 presents the regression results averaged across all industryyear estimations. The average R-square is 33%, which suggests that this cross-sectional model has reasonable predictive power.
After we obtained the estimated coefficients for each industry-year group (b 0 , b 1 , b 2 ), we calculate the "normal" level of marketing expenditure (NMKT) for each firm as follows:
where our measure of unanticipated change in marketing expenditures is the difference between actual marketing expenditure in year t and the fitted normal marketing The Role of Relative Strategic Flexibility / 65 expenditure for the same year, defined as UMKT it = MKT it -NMKT it .
We acknowledge that managers use various inputs in determining their companies' marketing spending. However, we try to forecast rather than explain issuers' marketing intensity. Thus, omitted variables do not pose a significant threat to the predictive ability of the model as long as they are correlated with the independent variables included in the model (for a detailed discussion about forecasting vs. explaining, see Mizik 2012; Mizik and Jacobson 2009) . Given that our model has a respectable R-square (comparable with the 38% reported in Roychowdhury 2006), we believe we can measure the unexpected portion of issuers' marketing expenditure intensity with a certain degree of confidence.
Strategic flexibility of rivals. Our proxy for flexibility is financial leverage. In line with previous studies (e.g., Gielens et al. 2008; Rego, Billett, and Morgan 2009) , we define financial leverage as total debt [long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT) + debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC)], divided by total assets. To calculate relative strategic flexibility of rivals with respect to issuers, we follow the standardization approach Campello (2006) suggests. That is, we first calculate the mean leverage of the remaining companies in the same two-digit industry as issuers. Then, we calculate the difference between the leverage of the issuer and the mean leverage of rivals. However, Campello (2006) points out that it is the relative size of the difference rather than the absolute size that matters. Therefore, we divide the difference between the leverage of the issuer and the mean leverage of rivals by the standard deviation of leverage of all firms in an industry. As a result, we obtain our measure of rivals' relative flexibility (RIVALFLEX). The standardization enables us to use the same metric across different industries. Positive values of RIVALFLEX indicate that rivals have greater strategic flexibility than issuers, whereas negative values indicate the opposite. 7 Another way to obtain unanticipated changes in marketing expenditure is to estimate a first-order autoregressive model where the dependent variable is MKT it and the independent variable is MKT i,t -1 . However, as Mizik (2010) suggests, estimating a firstorder autoregressive model using panel data raises econometric issues. That is, in the presence of fixed effects, the estimated coefficient on MKT i,t -1 will be biased. She suggests that applying the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) procedure, which involves firstdifferencing demeaned variables and then using instruments for the first-differenced MKT t -1 measure, results in consistent estimates. However, this procedure requires using MKT t -2 and MKT t -3 to create an instrument for the first-differenced MKT t -1 . In the case of IPOs, we will not be able to apply this procedure in year +1 because accounting/marketing data for most of the IPO firms are not available in Compustat for the years preceding the pre-IPO year. Thus, we prefer the cross-sectional estimation method, which is robust to the aforementioned problem and has reasonable predictive power. 
Analysis and Results
IPOs/SEOs and Postoffering Marketing Expenditures
We first examine whether IPO and SEO firms significantly increase their marketing spending after an equity offering. 8 In addition, we analyze whether they adopt a more aggressive marketing strategy than their rivals subsequent to the offering. Thus, in Table 3 we report both raw (unadjusted) changes and industry-adjusted changes in the marketing expenditures of issuing firms. We determine raw changes by calculating the yearly difference in marketing expenditures and scaling it by total assets. To obtain industry-adjusted values, we first calculate the mean of the raw changes in marketing expenditures of rival firms and subtract it from the raw change in marketing expenditures of the issuer. 9 The results show that both the IPO and SEO samples, on average, exhibit a significantly positive change in marketing expenditures in the two years following an offering. The raw changes for both groups are significant at the 1% level. However, the increase in marketing expenditures for the IPO firms is much higher than that for the SEO firms in year +1 (IPO: 7.73% vs. SEO: 4.02%, t = 11.79, p < .01). Both groups also significantly increase their marketing expenditures in year +2 (vs. the baseline year), but there is no difference between the two groups (IPO: 3.256% vs. SEO: 2.96%, t = .80, n.s.). Furthermore, industry-adjusted values for both samples are significantly positive at the 1% level in the two years following issue, indicating that issuers adopt a more aggressive marketing strategy than their rivals during those years. Again, the IPO firms exhibit
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a larger industry-adjusted change than the SEO firms in year +1 (IPO: 4.678% vs. SEO: 1.73%, t = 9.70, p < .01) but not in year +2 (IPO: 1.08% vs. SEO: .79%, t = .85, n.s.). Overall, it seems that IPO and SEO firms typically allocate additional funds to marketing and follow a more aggressive strategy than their rivals in the two years following equity issue. 10
Unanticipated Change in Marketing, Strategic Flexibility, and Firm Value
Although the preceding analysis shows that some of the capital raised from equity offerings is, on average, allocated to marketing, it does not confirm that such efforts have a positive impact on firm value, nor does it examine the moderating effect of strategic flexibility. To test H 1 , we estimate the following stock-return response model separately for our IPO and SEO samples by using ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level:
The dependent variable in this model is the annual stock return. We estimated the model separately for year +1 and year +2 following an offering because the number of firms entering the model differs for each year on the basis of the availability of stock return and marketing data. Specifically, in year +1 regressions, we regress the stock return calculated for the fiscal year following the offering year on the 10 We find that the industry-adjusted changes for both samples are close to zero and nonsignificant in years +3 and +4 (IPO year +3: .13%, t = .44, n.s.; IPO year +4: .23%, t = .93, n.s.; SEO year +3: -.12%, t = -.84, n.s.; SEO year +4: .03%, t = .24, n.s.). These findings suggest that enhanced marketing expenditures by issuers are observed only for the two years immediately following an equity offering. 8 Although IPOs and SEOs both involve issuance of equity, they are two separate corporate financing events. Unlike SEO firms, IPO firms are private firms with no publicly traded stock before the offering. Therefore, key articles examining equity offerings analyze the two events separately (e.g., Chemmanur and Yan 2009; Loughran and Ritter 1995; Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang 2008) . We follow this tradition. 9 We Winsorized both raw and industry-adjusted changes at the 1st and 99th percentile levels to reduce the impact of outliers. independent variables measured for the fiscal year following the offering year (except for book-to-market ratio [BM] and market value [MV] , for which we use the lagged values as is done in prior studies). Similarly, in year +2 regressions, we regress the stock return calculated for the fiscal year following the first postoffering fiscal year on the independent variables measured contemporaneously as well as lagged book-to-market ratio and market value. In addition, note that both UMKT and RIVALFLEX are mean-centered to facilitate the interpretation of the main effects (Aiken and West 1991) . All variance inflation factor values are less than 3, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem (for the correlation matrix, see Table 4 ). We use several control variables. Because previous research has shown that unanticipated changes in accounting performance measures such as return on assets (ROA) and sales can predict stock returns (e.g., Kothari 2001), we include measures of both as control variables in our model. We calculate ROA by dividing income before extraordinary items (Compustat item IB) by total assets (e.g., Rego, Billet, and Morgan 2009). We then estimate the following firstorder autoregressive model with firm fixed effects 11 :
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The model includes firm fixed effects because we estimate a pooled regression model using all firm-year observations available for issuers included in each sample. By doing so, we try to avoid using biased coefficient estimates stemming from omitted firm-specific factors. We use the residuals from this model as the estimates of unanticipated change in ROA (UROA) of the issuing firm. Following Mizik and Jacobson (2008) , we calculate unanticipated change in sales as USales it = log(Sales it ) -log(Sales it -1 ).
We also control for industry concentration. Drawing from prior studies (e.g., Luo, Homburg, and Wieseke 2010), we measure industry concentration using the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI), calculated using all Compustat firms with the available data. The index is defined as HHI j = S r i = 1 s 2 ij , where s ij is the market share of firm i in industry j (defined by two-digit SIC code). Thus, HHI ranges between 0 and 1. Lower HHI suggests that the industry is shared by many competitors, whereas higher HHI implies that it is concentrated in the hands of a small number of large firms. Furthermore, to control for the general market conditions, we include the compounded annual return for the market (MRET) using the Center for Research in Security Prices value-weighted index. Finally, we include lagged market value and book-to-market ratio to capture firm-specific size and value risk factors, respectively (Fama and French 1993) . Market value is the natural log of end-of-year stock price (Compustat item PRCC_F) multiplied by number of shares outstanding (Compustat item CHSO). Book-to-market ratio is the natural log of book value of common stock (Compustat item CEQ) divided by market value. Note that to mitigate the impact of outliers, we Winsorized all the continuous variables entered into the model at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. Table 5 reports the results. 12 For IPO firms, there is a positive and significant effect of unanticipated marketing expenditure on stock returns for the year +1 (b 1 = .373, p < .01). Furthermore, there is a negative and significant interaction between UMKT and RIVALFLEX (b 3 = -.313, p < .05), in support of H 1 . That is, the greater the rivals' strategic flexibility, the lesser the positive impact of marketing on issuers' firm value. Remember that we estimate these coefficients using meancentered values (i.e., mean RIVALFLEX = 0) and that RIVALFLEX is a standardized measure. As a result, post hoc analysis reveals that when rivals' strategic flexibility as compared with issuers is one unit lower, the impact of unanticipated change in marketing expenditures on firm value is almost doubled (b UMKT, Low RIVALFLEX = .687, t = 4.77, p < .01). In contrast, in the situations of rivals' high flexibility by one unit of relative strategic flexibility, the
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positive impact of increased marketing is canceled out (b UMKT, High RIVALFLEX = .060, t = .43, n.s.). In other words, an unanticipated increase in marketing expenditures in the year following an IPO results in higher firm value only for issuers facing rivals with limited strategic flexibility. Although the results are qualitatively similar in year +2, neither the main effect of marketing (b 1 = .140, n.s.) nor the interaction effect is significant (b 3 = -.077, n.s.). This finding may largely be the result of the fact that IPO firms undertake large increases in marketing spending in year +1, as noted previously.
In contrast to IPO firms, the main effect of unanticipated marketing for SEO firms is not significant in year +1 (b 1 = -.066, n.s.). We also observed this result for year +2 (b 1 = -.060, n.s.). However, consistent with H 1 , there is a significant negative interaction between UMKT and RIVALFLEX in both year +1 (b 3 = -.346, p < .01) and year +2 (b 3 = -.328, p < .01). These results again suggest that the relative strategic flexibility of rivals with respect to issuers play an important role in determining the impact of marketing on firm value during the period immediately following an SEO. Specifically, post hoc analyses reveal that when RIVALFLEX is one unit below (above) the mean, there is a positive (negative) link between unanticipated marketing expenditures and stock returns (Year +1: b UMKT, LowRIVALFLEX = .280, t = 1.90, p < .10; b UMKT, HighRI-VALFLEX = -.411, t = -2.82, p < .01; Year +2: b UMKT, LowRIVALFLEX = .268, t = 1.65, p < .10; b UMKT, HighRI-VALFLEX = -.389, t = -2.31, p < .05). From these results, we can conclude that the stock market reacts favorably when The dependent variable in each column is the annual stock returns. The independent variables are measured contemporaneously with stock returns, except BM and MV, for which we use lagged values. IPOSEO dummy equals 1 if a fiscal year corresponds to the first or second year following an equity offering and 0 otherwise. The first column presents the results estimated using OLS and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The second column reports the results obtained using the Fama-MacBeth method and NeweyWest correction for standard errors. To mitigate outlier effects, we Winsorized all the variables at the 1st and 99th percentile levels.
issuers facing relatively less flexible rivals increase their marketing efforts beyond anticipated levels following an SEO, whereas we observe the opposite effect (i.e., negative abnormal stock return) for issuers with relatively more flexible rivals. It is worth noting that the main effect for the relative strategic flexibility of rivals is negative and significant in the second-year regressions for both IPOs and SEOs. 13 This is consistent with the extensive body of literature that documents that firms with higher financial leverage fail to respond to aggressive strategies initiated by their less leveraged rivals and thereby experience poor operating and stock return performance. At first glance, this evidence may seem inconsistent with Modigliani and Miller's (1958) proposition that capital structure has no impact on firm value. However, this irrelevance proposition relies on a set of strong assumptions (e.g., that there are no taxes and information asymmetries). More relevant to our study, they assume that finance leverage does not affect the probability distribution of earnings (i.e., there are no risks associated with using debt). On the contrary, a significant number of studies have shown that this assumption does not hold, because assuming larger debt makes a company more vulnerable to competition.
Postoffering Period Versus Nonoffering Period
To test H 2 , we augment our main regression model (Equation 4) with a new dummy variable (IPOSEO) that we allow to interact with UMKT and RIVALFLEX and use all the Compustat firm-year observations during 1970-2008 with available stock return, accounting, and marketing data. 14 By combining our previous IPO and SEO data sets with the Compustat data, we are able to identify postoffering and nonoffering periods. IPOSEO is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 for the two years immediately following any IPO or SEO issue and equal to 0 for all other periods. 15 Although years +3, +4, and so on are technically part of the postoffering period, we define our postoffering event window as year +1 and year +2. In addition, as we noted previously, we find that the significant increase in industryadjusted marketing expenditures of IPO and SEO firms shown for years +1 and +2 are not observed in years +3 and +4. Indeed, previous research (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo,
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and Stulz 2010) has shown that most SEO firms use a large amount of the cash raised through the offering in the year immediately following an offering. Thus, it seems reasonable to limit our attention to the two years after the offering and label this period the (immediate) postoffering period. The modified model includes the following variables:
All the variables are as defined previously. We calculate annual stock returns (for each fiscal year) for all the firms on Compustat with available accounting and marketing data and regress them on contemporaneously measured independent variables, except BM and MV, for which we use the lagged values. That is, unlike Equation 3, the dependent variable is not just issuers' postoffering stock returns; rather, we employ panel data with all the annual observations available for an issuer. However, to distinguish the postoffering and nonoffering periods, we use the IPOSEO dummy, which turns on if a fiscal year corresponds to the first or second year following an equity offering. In addition, the coefficient of interest to test our second hypothesis is b 7 . Finding a negative and significant coefficient on this three-way interaction term will provide support for our argument that the interactive influence of unanticipated marketing expenditures and relative strategic flexibility of rivals is more pronounced in the period immediately following an IPO or SEO.
The final sample we use to estimate our model includes 58,236 firm-year observations. Because we have more than one yearly observation per firm in our pooled data set, we need to control for both cross-sectional correlation and serial correlation across observations while estimating our OLS model. Otherwise, standard errors of the estimated coefficients will be biased. Clustering standard errors at the firm level has been shown to produce unbiased standard errors unless the number of observations in each cluster is too small (Petersen 2009 ). This should not be a concern for our sample because it covers a sufficiently long period of time (average number of observations per firm = 8.4). Furthermore, Petersen (2009) shows that the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method also generates unbiased standard errors in the absence of serial correlation. The Fama-MacBeth method involves estimating the OLS regression separately in each year and then calculating estimated coefficients/ standard errors on the basis of the time-series averages of parameters obtained from each yearly regression. Drawing on previous literature, we estimate our model by using both methods: cluster-robust standard errors (i.e., firm level) and 13 Due to its significant main effect on stock returns as well, relative strategic flexibility is more correctly referred to as a "quasimoderator" than as a pure moderator (see Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie 1981) .
14 In the sample we used to test H 1 , the last firm-year observation belongs to 2006 (i.e., year +2 for IPOs/SEOs issued in 2004).
To test H 2 , we expanded our sample to include firm-year observations through 2008. As a result, we have two additional years of observations (i.e., nonoffering period) for IPOs issued in 2004. 15 In contrast to the previous section, we do not exclude those IPOs followed by an SEO in the two-year period or those SEOs issued within two years after the IPO. This is because we are now comparing the postoffering period with the nonoffering period rather than testing a unique IPO or SEO effect. If we do not include those previously excluded IPOs or SEOs in our sample, the periods immediately following those offerings will be falsely coded as a nonoffering period, biasing our results.
Fama-MacBeth estimation with the Newey-West correction for serial correlation. Although we focus our discussion on the pooled OLS results, the Fama-MacBeth results are similar.
The first column of Table 6 presents results obtained from pooled OLS with cluster-robust standard errors. The
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main effect for UMKT (b 1 = .090, p < .01) is positive and significant, and the interaction between UMKT and RIVALFLEX (b 4 = -.090, p < .01) is again negative and significant. Furthermore, there is a significant three-way interaction between UMKT, RIVALFLEX, and IPOSEO (b 7 = -.175, p < .05), in support of H 2 . That is, the interactive influence of marketing and relative strategic flexibility reported previously is significantly magnified in the period immediately following the equity offering. As the second column of Table 6 reports, we also obtain the significant three-way interaction when we use the Fama-MacBeth method (b 7 = -.222, p < .05).
Post hoc analyses of the OLS results reveal that in the situations of high relative flexibility of rivals by one unit of strategic flexibility, the impact of marketing on firm value doubles during nonoffering periods (b UMKT, LowRIVALFLEX, Nonoffering = .181, t = 6.76, p < .01) and quadruples during the two years following an offering (b UMKT, LowRIVALFLEX, Postoffering = .356, t = 5.85, p < .01). This is consistent with our argument that the interaction between marketing and strategic flexibility is magnified during the postoffering period versus other periods. Moreover, when the strategic flexibility of rivals compared with issuers is one unit lower, the positive main effect of marketing is canceled out during nonoffering periods (b UMKT, HighRIVALFLEX, Nonoffering = .000, t = .00, n.s.) and becomes negative during the postoffering period (b UMKT, HighRIVALFLEX, Postoffering = -.175, t = -2.88, p < .01).
Discussion
Both IPOs and SEOs play an important role in enhancing the competitive position of issuing firms. Issuers not only raise large amounts of cash that can be used to finance new projects but also significantly enhance their strategic flexibility by deleveraging their capital structures. Our research examines whether issuers use these funds to follow a more aggressive marketing strategy during the postoffering period and, more important, whether such investments are associated with increases in firm value. We find that both IPO and SEO firms significantly increase their marketing spending in the two years following an offering. However, we also demonstrate that not all issuers benefit from adopting an aggressive marketing strategy, and we examine a critical moderating variable that affects the link between marketing spending and firm value: relative strategic flexibility of industry rivals. Specifically, the stock market reacts favorably when issuing firms pursue an aggressive marketing strategy against rivals with relatively less flexibility, but the opposite is true for issuers facing more flexible rivals. Furthermore, we extend our analysis to examine how the valuation impact of marketing spending differs between the postoffering period and other periods. We find that the interactive influence of marketing expenditures and relative flexibility of rivals on firm value is more pronounced in the two-year period immediately following an offering than in other periods. We summarize these findings, along with their implications for managers (which we discuss subsequently), in Table 7 . 
Theoretical Implications
Our research helps extend the theory of market-based assets (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998) by examining how industry dynamics and market conditions affect value enhancement through marketing. In particular, our current knowledge of the marketing-finance interface around equity offerings is limited to the findings of a few studies examining the valuation impact of changes in the preoffering marketing expenditures of issuing firms (e.g., Luo 2008; Mizik and Jacobson 2007) . We extend this research by showing the valuation impact of changes in postoffering marketing expenditures. Our research is not limited to just an examination of postoffering period changes, however, because we contrast these changes with the role of increased marketing spending on firm value in other periods and find a significant difference between the two. Therefore, our findings also extend recent research examining the direct effect of marketing on stock returns (Joshi and Hanssens 2010; Srinivasan et al. 2009 ) by using a large sample of firms operating in a wide range of industries over an extensive time period. Furthermore, although previous research highlights strategic flexibility as a valuable organizational capability, there is little evidence regarding how increased flexibility contributes to shareholder wealth. In our study, we show that investors' valuation of equity-issuing firms' marketing efforts depends critically on whether those firms have more flexibility than rivals.
Finally, we extend the scope of previous work investigating the marketing-finance interface by including elements of firms' capital structure decisions. As Garmaise (2009) notes, this is an underexplored aspect of corporate finance in marketing research that needs further attention. Our work is directly related to prior research in the finance literature examining postoffering stock return underperformance (e.g., Loughran and Ritter 1995; Ritter 1991; Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995) . This stream of literature suggests that simply raising capital through IPOs and SEOs does not guarantee superior subsequent performance.
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Indeed, issuing firms often experience poor returns because they tend to overinvest in physical assets (e.g., Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang 2008) . We show that investment in marketing assets can help issuers earn higher stock returns, thus mitigating the postoffering underperformance often observed in the finance literature.
Managerial Implications
Managers know more about the current performance and future prospects of their firms than outsiders. Recent literature suggests that increased marketing spending can help managers reduce informational asymmetries before equity offerings and thereby increase the demand for their companies' stock (e.g., Luo 2008) . However, it cannot be overlooked that equity-offering firms, especially IPOs (which are private and often small firms), have limited resources during the preoffering period, restricting their ability to undertake major marketing campaigns. Indeed, the desire to raise more capital leads some managers to cut preoffering marketing expenditures in the hopes of boosting offer price through reporting higher earnings (Mizik and Jacobson 2007) . The postoffering period is therefore different than the preoffering period (and nonoffering periods in general) in that managers have the resources and flexibility to make major investments in marketing assets. We propose that postoffering marketing spending plays two important roles. First, investors are likely to interpret aggressive marketing expenditures as a signal of management's opinion that future profitability will be higher. Second, adopting an aggressive marketing strategy can mitigate investors' concern that a firm issued new shares to convert overvalued equity into cash rather than to take advantage of growth opportunities.
In light of our findings, we suggest a two-step plan for equity-offering firms. The first step involves crafting a solid marketing plan before the equity issuance and revealing some details of the plan in the offering prospectus, which often uses boilerplate language when mentioning the use of funds (e.g., "the company intends to use the net proceeds
Findings
Managerial Implications
Equity-issuing firms adopt a more aggressive marketing strategy by significantly increasing their marketing budgets.
Issuers: Enhanced flexibility triggered by equity offerings supports major marketing investments. Rivals: Maintain enough financing capacity to counteract issuers' strategic marketing actions.
Aggressive postoffering marketing spending results in higher firm value when issuers face rivals with relatively lower strategic flexibility.
Issuers: Enhanced postoffering marketing efforts help communicate growth opportunities to investors. Limited strategic flexibility of rivals makes the signaling effect of aggressive marketing spending more impactful.
Aggressive postoffering marketing spending does not translate into higher firm value (and can even destroy firm value) when issuers compete against rivals with relatively greater strategic flexibility.
Issuers: Avoid initiating costly postoffering marketing "fights" when rivals have both the ability and motivation to counteract. Instead, keep marketing spending within the traditional, expected range.
Aggressive marketing spending has a more pronounced impact on firm value during the twoyear postoffering period than any other period.
Issuers: Timely execution of the postoffering marketing plan is necessary to get the most benefit from the offer proceeds.
TABLE 7 Summary of Findings and Managerial Implications
from the offering for working capital and other general corporate purposes"). Providing hints about the extent to which proceeds will be used for marketing investments can not only enable issuers to raise higher capital (Hanley and Hoberg 2010) but also garner a more positive investor reaction when the firm actually undertakes those investments. This is because a well-thought-out postoffering marketing strategy-rather than a campaign financed with residual funds after covering other expenditures-communicates a stronger message regarding the managers' optimism. There is certainly a trade-off between attempting to reduce information asymmetries by sharing the details of postoffering marketing plans with investors and revealing valuable information to competitors, which is the very reason some companies do not disclose their marketing expenditures as a separate item on the income statement. In addition, given that enhanced marketing spending does not translate into higher postoffering firm value in the case of issuers that face rivals with greater strategic flexibility, such firms would be better off if they refrained from initiating an aggressive marketing strategy and communicated this message clearly in the prospectus. Indeed, our results suggest that unwise use of marketing resources can erode or even destroy shareholder value when rivals have greater capability and a motivation to respond to issuers' aggressive marketing efforts.
The second step involves a timely execution of the proposed marketing strategy. At this step, managers must recognize that the impact of marketing spending depends on market conditions. That is, the positive effects of increased marketing spending are greater in the period immediately following equity issuance than at other times, for several reasons. First, equity offerings (especially IPOs) result in heightened investor attention. Second, because equity offerings significantly deleverage issuers and generate a large amount of funds in a short period of time, they enhance the competitive position and strategic flexibility of issuers over rivals. However, this competitive advantage of issuers does not last forever, dissipating relatively quickly as the offering proceeds are depleted. Accordingly, a failure to abide by the proposed marketing plan would diminish the manager's reputation and credibility with market participants. Managers must also realize that there are decreasing returns to marketing expenditures. In particular, unusually high marketing spending by IPO firms in the first year after the offering is notable. One immediate implication evident in our results is that additional marketing spending in the following period does not enhance shareholder wealth. Therefore, allocating marketing funds in a balanced fashion year to year can help managers realize higher returns on their investments.
Finally, our results also offer implications for the managers of rival firms operating in the same industry as issuers. They should be aware that equity issuing is followed by a period in which issuers enhance their marketing budgets, resulting in intense marketing-based competition. Limited strategic flexibility stemming from high financial leverage may prevent rival firms from initiating a timely and effective countermarketing campaign.
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Limitations and Further Research
Our research is not without its limitations. Although previous work (e.g., Luo 2008; Mizik 2010; Mizik and Jacobson 2007) has commonly used our measure of marketing spending (SG&A expenditure minus R&D expenditure), we acknowledge that it includes nonmarketing expenses, such as administrative overhead and legal expenditures. On the one hand, it is not possible to isolate marketing expenditures using Compustat data. On the other hand, a key advantage of using Compustat is that it provides comprehensive data on SG&A and R&D expenditures for many firms across a variety of industries.
Another limitation of our study is that our measure of strategic flexibility (i.e., financial leverage) does not fully reflect the extent to which a company has a flexible organizational structure. Operational and managerial flexibility are also important determinants of a company's overall strategic flexibility (Aaker and Mascarenhas 1984) . However, the data on those dimensions of flexibility are not readily available. Future studies could survey industry experts or use statements in the companies' annual reports to operationalize strategic flexibility on a broader scale. Although this alternative approach would allow for a more comprehensive and complete examination of the role of strategic flexibility on firm performance, it relies less on objective measures. Given that the strategic flexibility is closely linked to marketing and firm value, further research should explore a broader conceptualization of flexibility and alternative ways to measure it.
Moreover, although we note that increased marketing spending can signal both higher and less risky future cash flows, we do not distinguish the two channels of value creation in our tests. It would be worthwhile to examine the potential risk reduction implications of enhanced postoffering marketing budgets, particularly during turbulent economic conditions. Note that Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2010) reveal that systematic risk declines during the post-SEO period. However, they do not examine how marketing spending relates to changes in postoffering systematic risk. Future studies could explore the role of marketing spending and strategic flexibility in changing risk dynamics around equity offerings.
It is also worth noting that our study does not provide any direct evidence about the extent to which marketing managers are involved in the process of equity offerings and in determining the use of funds. Our results, however, suggest that marketing managers can be instrumental in helping issuers use offer proceeds in a value-enhancing manner. Therefore, it would be fruitful to examine issuing firms' practices by conducting surveys or in-depth interviews with marketing and finance executives. Finally, we only focus on IPOs and SEOs, which are leverage-decreasing financing events that enhance firms' strategic flexibility. However, it would be worthwhile to examine how leverage-increasing events such as debt offerings (capital inflow) or share repurchases (capital outflow) affect marketing strategy and how investors respond to changes in firms' marketing expenditures around these events.
Conclusion
To enhance their marketing expenditures, IPO and SEO firms allocate significant amounts of capital raised through their equity offerings. However, the link between these marketing expenditures and firm value is heterogenous across firms and market conditions. Only those issuers competing against rivals with relatively less strategic flexibility benefit from the adoption of an aggressive marketing strategy. In
The Role of Relative Strategic Flexibility / 73 addition, the interactive influence of marketing expenditures and strategic flexibility of rivals on firm value is more salient in the postoffering period than in other periods. These findings add significantly to the field's understanding of how marketing and finance decisions interact at the corporate level, specifically offering new insights into how corporate financial structure affects marketing strategy as well as overall firm value.
